Real adjustment in the transformation process: risk factors in East Germany by Siebert, Horst
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Siebert, Horst
Working Paper
Real adjustment in the transformation
process: Risk factors in East Germany
Kiel Working Papers, No. 507
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Siebert, Horst (1992) : Real adjustment in the transformation process: Risk
factors in East Germany, Kiel Working Papers, No. 507, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/600Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 507
EAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS:
RISK FACTORS IN EAST GERMANY
by
Horst Siebert
Institutfiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Dusternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 507
REAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS!




The author, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is solely
responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel
Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticism and
suggestions directly to the author and to clear any quotations
with him.Real Adjustment In the Transformation Process:
Risk Factors in East Germany
Horst Siebert*, Kiel
East Germany can be considered as a laboratory experiment in the
economics of transition. Of the three major issues of economic
reform in the transformation process (Siebert 1991c), two were
solved nearly instantaneously. Monetary stabilization was achiev-
ed by extending the currency area of the DM to East Germany in
the currency union of July 1, 1990. And the institutional infra-
structure was introduced with one stroke when East Germany joined
West Germany according to Article 23 of the German constitution.
Thus, only the third major area of reform remained to be solved,
namely real adjustment in the economy, especially in the previ-
ously state owned firms. The transformation of the East German
economy thus can be viewed to be a specific exercise in real
economic adjustment.
In this paper I look at some of the risks that may arise from the
transformation process in East Germany for German economic
policy. Some factors which represented risks in 1990 no longer do
because either a positive or a negative outcome has to be record-
ed (Section 1). The remaining risks relate to getting trapped on
a low level of development in East Germany (Section 2), to
privatization getting stuck (Section 3), to an explicit structur-
al policy (Section 4), to a persistence of the second labor
market (Section 5), and to transfers turning into a burden for
Germany as a whole (Section 6). Some conclusions are drawn in
Section 7.
*I appreciate comments from Alfred Boss, Ralph Heinrich, Michael
Huther and Klaus Dieter Schmidt.- 2 -
1. Three Hindsight Risks
Two years ago, one major risk of German unification was the
political mechanism by which the two Germanies would merge. More
specifically, the debate on a revision of the constitution among
independent states would have required one or two years; this
would have been associated with high economic uncertainty nega-
tively affecting public transfers into East Germany, reducing
private capital flows, raising interest rates and depreciating
the DM. This risk has not materialized due to East Germany
accepting the German constitution which will now be revised under
different conditions.
Another risk related to inflationary pressures due to the conver-
sion rate chosen in extending the currency area of the DM to East
Germany in the currency union. Judging from the inflation rate
(for West Germany) of 2.7 percent in 1990 and 3.5 percent in
1991, one may come to the conclusion that the inflationary risk
did not materialize. Looking more closely, this file cannot be
closed yet. From May 1990 to May 1991, M-3 increased by 20
percent (Bundesbank, Monatsberichte). With the production of East
Germany accounting for 6.7 percent of the West German level in
the second half of 1991 (Sachverstandigenrat 1991b, 60) and
allowing for a normal increase in the money supply of 5 percent
in West Germany, arithmetically, there was an excess supply of
money amounting to 8 percent of the total money supply. Note that
the interest rate structure was slightly positive in 1990.
The above calculation, however, is somewhat misleading because
East Germans were not yet used to the portfolio choices typical
for a market economy and money served as a substitute of non-
monetary financial assets. Thus, money balances held by the non-
banking sector do not necessarily represent a source of infla-
tionary pressure. It is hard to say to what extent this portfolio
The figure for June 1990 was already affected by the currency
union.- 3 -
aspect completely compensates the arithmetical excess supply and
whether the monetary coat of 19.90 had oversize.
In any case, the Bundesbank followed a policy of mopping up some
of the excess supply of money, reducing the rate of increase in
the money supply in the first half of 1991. The interest rate
structure became inverse in 1991 pointing to a restrictive
monetary policy. Thus, the currency union had implications in
2
1991 . Moreover, if vthere is a time lag of one to two years until
the increase in the money supply affects the price level (Scheide
1991), the price increase in 1991 and 1992 may be, in part, the
result of the 1990 increase in the money supply. Last but not
least, the change in the price level will affect wage increases
in West Germany in 19.92.
We also know more about the third risk factor of the year 1990,
wage costs. From the second quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter
of 1991, the effective wage per employee in East Germany has
risen by 64 percent. At the end of 1991, wage contracts for East
Germany were concluded reaching .60-65 percent of the West German
nominal level; the Sachverstandigenrat expects that on average
East German employees will reach 70 percent of the West German
contract wage level in 1992. In April 1991, the effective wage
income per employee was 47.1 percent of the West German level
(Sachverstandigenrat 1991b, III).
The wage increases in Eastern Germany have caused repercussions
in a number of areas. They have made investment less profitable.
While they will not greatly affect capital-intensive projects of
West German or international firms investing in East Germany,
they do have a negative impact on the birth of new and small
firms which face uncertain revenue since they are not yet estab-
lished in the market. Adjustment of the old state firms is made
more difficult. Moreover, the demand for labour in the adjustment
2
The conversion rate affected the pressure for a wage increase
and influenced the aspiration level of people in East Germany.- 4 -
phase will be reduced thus leading to higher unemployment and a
greater need for government programms and transfers. Moreover,
the wage level influences social security payments. Thus, wage
policy in East Germany directly affects fiscal policy.
2. Will the Potential Growth Process Become Trapped?
The most important question for the future is whether a self-
sustained growth process will start in Eastern Germany. We know
very well from the economics of transition (Siebert 1991a; Long
and Siebert 1991) that the transition from a centralized social-
ist planning system to a market economy presents a shock to the
representative socialist firm changing all its contraints includ-
ing the price vector. For the overwhelming number of firms, this
shock can be modelled as a sudden unexpected drop in the produc-
er's price. This implies that the capital stock of the firm or
the firm itself as a net of contractual relationships becomes
largely obsolete.
If we aggregate over all firms the capital stock of the economy
becomes obsolete to a considerable degree. It has to be rebuilt
through investment. Human capital in its given occupations is
also partly made obsolete, although qualifications of East German
workers are judged as being not too different from those of West
Germans. By reallocation and retraining, human capital can
adjust. The concept of obsoleteness can also be applied to
infrastructure capital which has to be improved and restructured.
Another stock variable that is made obsolete is the spatial
structure of the economy. Last but not least, the capital of
nature, the environment, which was polluted in the old system,
will have to be restored.
For the adjustment process of the economy we obtain a J-curve of
aggregate output in the transition to a market system falling
abruptly and eventually catching up with the adjustment of firms
going on and new firms coming into existence. Employment follows
a u-curve with the initial level of over-employment not being
reached again (Siebert 1992).- 5 -
In 1991, the bottom of the valley in the J-curve of output has
been reached in East Germany. Output of the manufacturing indus-
try is at one-third of the 1989 level; GNP was 193,1 bill. DM in
1991, 6.9 percent of the West German level (whereas population is
25 percent).
A self-sustained growth process has not yet begun. Aggregate
domestic demand of East Germany amounted to 3.61,2 bill. DM in
1991, i.e. .187 percent of GNP. The trade deficit was 168,1 bill.
DM. Aggregate demand is financed by transfers which are estimated
at 145 bill. DM for the government sector (Table 1).




Ghange in Inventories 2.4
Aggregate Domestic Demand 361.2




Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Press Release, January 15., 1992.
Simple formula tell us how much time is needed for East Germany
to catch up. Consider a situation where East Germany reaches 80
percent of the West German level of GNP per capita.. This is not
an unrealistic frame of reference since in West Germany some
regions reach a similar percentage. Then everything depends on
the difference in the real growth rates between East and West
Germany. Table 2 shows the years needed for adjustment to 80
percent for various growth differentials. Such calculations
Let Ygi and Yg., be the initial increase in East and West, let a
be the level to Be reached, let j3 = 0.25 indicate the size of the
Forts. Fu£note— 6 "
should not be overestimated. It is quite conceivable that in
specific years high growth rates in the 20 percent range occur in
East Germany.







Assuming that East Germany will have the same capital stock per
capita as West Germany after the transformation process has
ended, the capital stock of the enterprise sector should be 1214
4
bill. DM (Table 3). This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation
for the accumulated investment assuming that the existing capital
stock is completely obsolete. Infrastructure capital in East
Germany should amount to 530 bill. DM. Assuming that one-third of
the capital stock is usable, and considering a ten-year period of
adjustment, private investment of 80 bill, and public investment
Forts. Fu^note
East German population relative to West Germany, and let r and














The total West German capital stock was 10464 bill. DM in 1990,
that of the enterprise sector 4785 bill DM.- 7 -
of 40 bill, per year, i.e. 120 bill. DM per year, would be
needed .
































































(a) Calculated as 26 percent of the West German capital stock in 1989. -
(b) Including goods-producing crafts. - (c) New construction and moderniza-
tion. - (d) Evaluated at replacement costs. - (e) Capital stock at 1986
prices.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [1990]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989];
own estimates.
Calculations for public investment do not include environmental
protection.- 8 -
Self-sustained growth can only start if the obsolete stock
variables are newly built up. Investment in 1991 is estimated at
72.4 bill. DM which is 38 percent of the actual East German GNP,
but is way too low relative to the potential GNP of 650 bill. DM
that East Germany might have after the complete adjustment
process. Investment per capita is half of the West German figure.
More specifically, private investment, which amounts to 50
percent of the total, is too low. For 1992, investment of 90 bill
DM is expected (Sachverstandigenrat 1991b).
It would be tempting to apply the West German capital output
ratio to determine the investment needed in order to reach a
specific growth rate or to calculate the growth effect of a given
investment. For instance, applying the West German average
capital output ratio of 4.4 to the investment of 90 bill. DM
expected in 1992, the increase in GNP will be 20 bill. DM.
Private investment of 45 bill. DM would yield an increase in GNP
of 17 bill. DM using the capital output ratio of the enterprise
sector of 2.6. These calculations are misleading because we
should expect an output effect of investment higher than the
average capital output ratio in an economy where the capital
stock is built up from scratch. Thus, it is more promising to
apply the marginal capital output ratio which can be expected to
be lower than the average ratio. In addition, the marginal
capital output ratio of the late forties and the early fifties is
an indication of the output effects that are possible under the
most favorable circumstances.
Measuring the marginal output capital ratio by the increase in
GNP to the increase in the gross capital stock, the marginal
output capital ratio shows a great variation since 1950. Whereas
in the late eighties it showed values around 0.45, the early
fifties have seen values larger than 1 (Table A5). This would
indicate a situation in which investment would increase GNP by
the same amount.
The East German experience reminds us that a supply response
needs time as was demonstrated by the two oil shocks. The Erhard
reforms of 1948 cannot be used as a frame of reference for a- 9 -
quick take-off since prior to 1948 adjustment had already taken
place to some extent. Industrial output rose from one-quarter of
the 1936 level in 1945 to roughly half of the 1936 level in 1948
(Schmieding 1991). Moreover, in East Germany special conditions
for the depreciation of the stock variables prevailed. The
exchange rate could not be used as a buffer; wage increases are
not in line with productivity.
In the long run, East Germany has a positive growth perspective
due to the incentives of the market system, due to capital
accumulation which will be associated with a high growth rate and
due to the integration in the international division of labor
(Siebert 1991b).
A major issue, however, is to what extent bottlenecks in East
Germany hinder investment and prevent the growth process from
starting and gaining momentum. These factors are the uncertainty
with respect to property rights, a shortage of location space, an
administration that had (and still has) to be built up and an
insufficient infrastructure in communication and transportation.
Over time, the factors limiting growth will become less impor-
tant. This can be expected for the administration. A quick
improvement in the infrastructure hinges on a number of issues.
First, government planning tends to be slow, especially when it
involves several layers of government. Moreover, budgetary
processes are time-consuming. Here privatization of parts of the
infrastructure can help in bringing about an improved supply of
infrastructure more quickly and more efficiently. German economic
policy has not been daring and innovative enough to introduce the
privatization of some parts of infrastructure, for instance in
the telecommunication area. Second, larger infrastructure, pro-
jects in West Germany such as main highways or new railroad
tracks require up to twenty years from the start of planning to
completion. This is mainly due to the institutional set-up of the
authorization procedure including the procedural steps, especial-
ly in the administrative court systems. The clash of interest
between the growth target and environmental protection is at the
root of the problem. It is quite clear that with time horizons of- 10 -
this length the infrastructure in East Germany cannot be built up
quickly. It will
7 have to be seen whether a law attempting to
reduce the requirements for the authorization procedure will be
successful. •..'••••'•
3. Will Privatization Get Stuck?
Property rights uncertainty is estimated to be the most important
bottleneck to a self-sustained growth process. Three different
categories of property are involved: land including buildings
(not firms) where the previous owners have a right to be reinsti-
tuted, those firms which will be given back to their previous
owners, and state-owned firms where new ownership has to be
established. The systematic problem is that ownership of land and
ownership of firms' are disjunct and that the assignment of
property titles, the mapping of objects and owners, may be
inconsistent.
There are 1,2 million applications for reinstitution into the
ownership of land. Each of these applications has to be decided
administratively with title records not being up to date and with
inheritance relationships being rather complex. Moreover, each
administrative decision can be challenged in the administrative
court system. It is estimated by experts that it will take ten
years to clarify these ownership claims.
Reprivatization of firms relates to 17.000 cases with roughly
4,000 having been given back by September 1991. The most impor-
tant issue is the privatization of previously state owned firms.
The small privatization programme, i.e. the privatization of
stores, small hotels etc. is completed. Until December 31, 1991,
Treuhand has privatized 5210 firms of the productive sector out
of 10537, i.e. 49.4 percent (Table A2). According to the sales
contracts, employment of 930,000 and investment of 84 bill DM is
expected. Treuhand still has 1.65 million employees after start-
ing-out with 4.08 million. Unfortunately, we have no information
on the type and structure of firms that still have to be privat-
ized.• - 11 -
Whenever the principle of reinstituting the previous owner and
privatization are in conflict, a new law attempts to give prefer-
ence to investment and employment (Vermogensgesetz). This law may
have some positive effect but it does not appear to change the
situation fun damentally. Its main impact is to somewhat affect
the bargaining position of the previous owner relative to the
investor and Treuhand. As "a matter of fact one solution to
property rights uncertainty is a contractual arrangement by these
three parties where still existing risks are allocated between
them. For instance Treuhand may cover a potential investor
against the risk of possibly having to give back parts of his
firm to a previous owner (who may not be known today). These
contractual arrangements have to be developed on a case-by-case
basis. The other solution to property rights uncertainty is for
an investor to circumvent land or firms loaded with uncertainty
by constructing houses or establishing new firms on the green
meadow.
There remains a sizeable task of privatization. The risk now is
that the privatization of firms will get more difficult. The
filet mignons have been privatized, and less attractive firms
remain. In the market of privatization, the demand for firms to
be sold may be lower. At the same time, more firms will have to
be closed. By December 1991, Treuhand had only closed 900 firms.
The closing of firms will lead to political pressure in the
regions affected. But there is also the political demand that
firms which cannot be privatized should remain in government
ownership so that Treuhand would develop into a government trust.
It can be expected that Treuhand will then generate deficits that
will be a severe burden for German fiscal policy. In 1991,
Treuhand had a deficit of 20 bill. DM; in addition, it guaranteed
banks credits to firms worth 30 bill. DM. It is expected that a
large part of these credit guarantees will become effective.
In order to avoid these developments and in order to avoid the
risks associated with them, the following measures are recommend-
ed (compare Sachverstandigenrat 1991b).- 12 -
In the privatization of firms, Treuhand should attempt to
mimick the market for firms as closely as possible. Treuhand
has used an informal bargaining approach which has severe
shortcomings because it is discretionary and because it allows
strategic behavior of the buyer. Treuhand claims that the sale
situation is complex and cannot easily be standardized.
Moreover, multiple criteria including the sales price, invest-
ment and employment guarantees and the reputation of the buyer
supposedly do not allow a formal sales procedure. Instead of
informal bargaining, Treuhand should use a two-stage bidding
process in which in the first round it collects all the
relevant information on the buyer's willingness to pay, to
invest and to employ. In the second round a contract specify-
ing investment and employment plans could be auctioned off
with the sales price being the only variable. In many cases,
reputational constraints can be introduced in the first round.
Treuhand should reorganize itself with the core activity of
privatization having its own budget.
- The core activity of privatization should be discontinued on
December 31, 1994. Firms for which an investor has not been
found until then must be closed. Only in rare cases can they
be handed over to the respective states. It should be made
explicit, however, that federal funds are not available for
those firms owned by the Lander. Subsidies to these firms must
compete directly with other expenditures of the Lander.
4. An Explicit Structural Policy?
The breakdown of the East German economy has led to the political
demand for an explicit structural policy for East Germany. The
main argument is to soften the adjustment process for firms in
order to reduce the negative impact on employment.
Such a policy would perpetuate the inefficiency of the plan-
ning system because it would de facto be oriented towards the
old structures. The option to modernize East Germany would befur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
- 13 -
lost. East Germany would remain a problem area for many years
to come.
The inefficient firms would have to be subsidized heavily.
Being determined in the political process subsidies will
become locked in, and it will be extremely difficult to reduce
them in the future. Moreover, managers and entrepreneurs will
be engaged in rent seeking instead of fulfilling their role of
innovating and implementing new allocations of factors of
production.
Subsidized old firms get in the way of new firms. They block
location space that is needed for the creation of new firms.
. This is especially relevant when location space is in short
supply due to property rights uncertainty. We also know from
West German sectoral policy that subsidized firms tend to set
the wage rate of a region. Subsidies allow them to pay a high
wage which impedes the new firms. Last but not least, subsid-
ized firms often compete with new firms on the product mar-
kets . . , . . •
The solution to such a conservationist. policy is to uncouple the
protection of people and the conservation of inefficient firms.
Transfers to people will ease the burden of adjustment. Basically
this approach is followed in the German case with transfers to
those on short-time work and active forms of employment policies
(among them so-called employment companies) relating to 400 000
persons at the end of 1991. In 1991 18.5 bill. DM were spent on
active employment policies excluding 7.8 bill. DM for unemploy-
ment benefits.
There is not only a political demand for structural policy for
the existing firms, but also an additional pressure for a more
active role of government in developing future industries. It is
argued that the government should decide which sectors should be
developed and which industries should be targeted for the future.
This approach is very likely to be a severe failure. First, the
government does not have information on which products, which
production procedure and which industry will flourish in the- 14 -
future. The root of the issue is the Hayekian problem of informa-
tion on future economic and technological possibilities. This
information is not available today and revealing this information
very much depends on the incentive mechanism that is used.
Industrial targeting will forego competition as an exploratory
device (Hayek 1968); by not allocating the risks of failure to
the investor it sets the wrong incentives.
If decisions on the future sectoral structure are politicized, it
also can be expected that the controlling mechanism of markets
will be put to the background. Consider the case that the polit-
ical process has taken a decision and that this decision turns
out to be an economic failure; then it is very likely that the
political process will attempt to cover up its previous decision
and legitimize it ex-post by granting new subsidies. Thus, there
is an endogenous process potentially leading to inefficiency.
Both a conservationist structural policy and industrial targeting
will have strong implications for fiscal policy. Since the
existing firms are inefficient, the financial means needed would
be immense and subsidies would have to be provided for a longer
period. They would trickle away without making the East German
industry more competitive. The sums required would dominate
German fiscal policy for the next years and the necessary consol-
idation of the budget would be made much more difficult. Here is
a severe risk for German economic policy.
Related to the problem of structural policy is the issue whether
East Germany will be characterized by spatial hysteresis. In such
a scenario the given spatial structure would not change very
much. Is such a scenario likely?
Some areas in East Germany will have an economic position more in
the centre. Berlin has the chance to be a strong growth pole due
to its role as the capital of Germany. Areas with a favorable
position in the hierarchy of infrastructure and with policy
induced centres of administration like the capitals of the new
federal states are also likely to develop into growth poles. The
former border regions will be more intensively integrated into- 15 -
West Germany and this interaction will improve their economic
conditions. We can also expect, that areas with skilled labor and
engineering talents will develop favorably, among them Sachsen
and Thiiringen which were the birth places of German engineering.
Restructuring will be much more difficult in old industrial areas
with a heavy concentration of inefficient firms. Due to the
extreme specialization of firms in East Germany these industrial
areas will often have a monostructure in which one industry
dominates (shipbuilding on the Baltic Sea, steel industry in
Eisenhiittenstadt, textiles in Sachsen, chemistry in Bitterfeld).
Where ecological damages of the past are concentrated they impede
restructuring (Bitterfeld). Rural areas in the northern part of
East Germany represent another aspect of monostructure. Finally,
regions adjoining Poland and Czechoslovakia will become relative-
ly more peripheral.
In these problem areas spatial hysteresis cannot be ruled out
completely. The outcome will depend on whether Treuhand will
succeed in privatizing firms in the problem regions and on
whether structural policy will perpetuate the existing ineffi-
cient structures.
5. Will the Second Labor Market Persist?
Wages are expected to reach an average of 70 percent of the West
German wage level in mid-1992. Although it seems to be unlikely
that the equalization of wages can be postponed for long, policy
must attempt to delay the adjustment. The best option would be to
have a strong wage differentiation with respect to regions,
sectors and firms. For instance, contract wages could rise at
some base rate; markets could differentiate the wage rate. This
can only be brought about if some elements of German labor market
regulation, such as declaring labor contracts as mandatory, are
temporarily not applied. The least one can attempt is a consensus
of politics, business and trade unions to delay the adjustment of
wages.- 16 -
In East Germany, a second labor market has been established with
an artificial, government-sponsored demand for labor. Policy
instruments used are transfers to short-time workers amounting to
roughly 90 percent of the previous salary up to June 1991.
Retraining of people including retraining in "employment com-
panies" is another policy measure. At the end of 1991, 400,000
people were covered by retraining activities. In addition,
360,000 people were in a public work program. The government-
sponsored activities of the second labor market, for instance
"employment companies", compete with the regular sector of the
economy; they compete in the goods markets because they produce
commodities that could be produced by private firms. And they
compete in the labor market because they nearly pay the same wage
as the regular sector. Thus, the incentive to move out of the
second labor market is small.
The emergence of the second labor market is the result of uncou-
pling the protection of people from subsidizing old firms. In
order to prevent the risk of wasting resources in conserving the
inefficient old firms, a new risk arises. For instance, an
organizational structure of employment companies is being estab-
lished with a three level structure of an employment company on
the level of each Land, in each labor office district and on a
more local level. These organizational structures will have their
own political weight, and it may be difficult to undo them when
the economic situation improves.
One policy instrument, the very generous short-time work arrange-
ment specifically designed for East Germany affecting two
million people at its climax in April 1991, was discontinued at
the end of 1991. With respect to this policy instrument, the
second labor market was not perpetuated.
The risks arising from wage policy and from a second labor market
can only be understood in the context of the institutional
§ 63, 5 Arbeitsforderungsgesetz Ost; now § 63, 4 applies.- 17 -
arrangement of the labor market in Germany. Employment relations
with governmental employment companies are interpreted as regular
labor contracts; consequently, it is argued that the second labor
market cannot have a wage different from the first labor market.
Wage contracts are declared mandatory by the government, thus
applying to non-union workers as well. As a consequence, a
differentiation of wages between regions and firms is not pos-
sible. So far, it is nearly impossible that firms in trouble have
a firm-specific contract. Another important feature of the German
labor law is that the new owner of the firm inherits the old wage
contracts and takes over people actually employed according to
Article 613a of the German Civil Code. The new owner cannot lay
off employees and has to pay the same wage. Definitely, this is
not an incentive to acquire state-owned firms. Even if the new
owner leaves the employer's association, he is bound by the wage
contracts bargained by his predecessors, i.e. the managers of the
old planning system. It has not been possible to suspend Article
613a of the German Civil Code.
The influence of the German labor market regulation on the
privatization and the restructuring of firms in East Germany
points to the more general question of how the adjustment of East
Germany is negatively affected by the institutional arrangement
that has developed in West Germany. Rules that may be fitting for
a relatively rich economy with a rather continuous growth process
and slow structural adjustment to the world economy are not
necessarily applicable to an economy in transition (Sachverstan-
digenrat 1991b). This relates not only to the labor market, but
also to the political and judicial process of providing infra-
structure, to regulations in the transportation and telecommuni-
cation sectors, to the institutional arrangement of the energy
sector as well as to other areas. Another important impact of the
institutional arrangement of the West German economy is that in
principle these rules define the protection level of people, i.e.
Article 613a has been suspended temporarily in the case of
bankruptcy.- 18 -
unemployment compensation, social welfare payments, etc. Thus>
these institutional arrangements define something like the social
minimal income or the reservation wage. Definitely, they have
influenced the transfers to East Germany.
6. The Fiscal Policy Risk
All the risks discussed so far will have an impact on fiscal
policy. Public transfers to East Germany are estimated at 145
bill. DM for 1992 with gross transfers amounting to 225 bill. DM.
The breakdown is given in Table 4.
The overall German government budget deficit including the
federal, state and municipal level as well as the social security
system amounted to 130 bill. DM in 1991; this is 4.6 percent of
GNP (Table 5). The 1992 overall governmental budget deficit is
expected to be 160 bill DM, that is 5.4 percent of GNP. These
data include the deficit of the German Unity Fund and of Treuhand
estimated at 31 bill. DM for 1992 (Table 5). If the governmental
telecommunication service and the railroads are included, the
public sector capital demand will amount to roughly 180.bill. DM
in 1992.
Budget risks relate to several factors (Table 6). One is the
deficit of Treuhand which may increase if Treuhand does not
succeed in privatizing firms. In 1991, a deficit of 20 bill, was
recorded. Including the deficit of 1990, the debt of Treuhand was
25 bill. DM at the end of 1991. In addition, Treuhand has guaran-
teed loans for 30 bill.; a large part of these guarantees will
become effective. Old debt of firms that are to be or already
have been privatized will be taken over by Treuhand; this debt
amounts to 70 bill. DM. In addition, compensating claims of firms
"for losses due to currency conversion" of 20 bill. DM have to be
added. This position is entered on the asset side of the firms.
Taking environmental liabilities of 45 bill. DM into account, it
is estimated that Treuhand may accumulate a debt of 250 bill. DM
up to 1994.- 19 -
Another risk is the financing of .labor market policies* The
social security system will realize, a deficit of 10 bill., DM in
1992 mainly because of additional labor market policy measures
arid because of additional benefits for the elderly in East
Germany; the contributions to the social security system will
have to be notably raised in the first half of the nineties in
order to avoid budget deficits. This will have a negative impact
on-the demand for labor and on economic activity in general.
At the end of 1993, the Credit Processing Fund, managing the
^liabilities of the former GDR state (Kreditabwicklungsfonds),
will have to be taken over by Treuhand; if Treuhand has not
accumulated assets as can be expected, the Credit Processing Fund


















































including European Recovery Programme
plus additional revenue because of higher GNP growth
Source: Sachverstandigenrat (1991/92), Table 46
has to be taken over half and half by the federal state and by
the new Lander. It is estimated by the Ministry of Finance that a
debt of 100 bill. DM will have been accumulated by the fund. The
German Unity Fund shared by the federal government and the Lander
will have accumulated 95 bill. DM at the end of 1994. The mora-- 20 -
torium on mortgages for the housing sector relating to a debt of
50 bill. DM will stop in 1993.
But there are other risks as well. One is defaults of East Euro-
pean debts, especially the former Soviet Union debt, and a non-
payment of export credits. In both cases the government will be
involved because debt and export credits were guaranteed by the
government. In addition, transfers may be needed for Eastern
Europe. This may become relevant when migration from Eastern
Europe picks up. Last but not least contributions to the European
Community are likely to increase, for instance due to the distri-
butive policies in preparation of the European Monetary Union.
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Table 6 -Financial Burden to the Public Sector: from Shadow Budgets and from





End of Moratorium on Mortgages
Eastern Europe
- Default in Debt



















a)(Federal, state and municipal budget)
The risk for the future is that the budget deficit will have a
strong impact on economic policy. The government may lose its
space of manoeuvring due to high interest payments. Unexpected
expenditures may arise. Government revenue may fall with a less
favorable business cycle. Financing expenditures may raise either
interest rates or taxes and this will choke off investment. The
most important danger is that the financial constraints will de-
velop into a severe burden for the West German economy which has
to finance transfers to East Germany. This could trigger a vi-
cious circle in which the problems of the East eventually influ-
ence the efficiency of the West.
In order to reduce this risk a consolidation strategy is required
(Sachverstandigenrat 1991b). The principle task must be to reduce
the government budget and to bring down the ratio of budget defi-
cit to GNP. This must be done by cutting expenditures. The polit-
ically easiest way to do this is to cap the nominal increase of
government expenditures. Whereas the federal government attempts
to keep the nominal increase of expenditures below 3 percent,- 22 -
there is no mechanism available by which the Lander and the muni-
cipalities of West Germany can be forced to reduce their spend-
ing. Instead of limiting the increase of expenditures, it would
be more appropriate to cut expenditures including subsidies and
to restructure expenditures under the new economic environment of
a united Germany. In many areas, West Germany and East Germany
compete for investible funds. This holds, of course, for infra-
structure projects in West Germany which may be postponed for a
year or two; it applies to subsidies for specific West German
sectors such as the coal industry competing directly with the
brown coal of East Germany and it holds for subsidies in regional
policy going to regions in West Germany that are better off than
areas in East Germany. So far, the political process has not had
enough vigour to restructure governmental expenditures. The Ger-
man public has not yet understood that the unification of Germany
has changed some conditions that were basic to West German poli-
cies and that now no longer prevail.
Privatizing infrastructure is an interesting option to reduce
governmental expenditure; in East Germany, it would have the ad-
ditional advantage of providing infrastructure much more quickly.
The communication industry could have been privatized, financing
itself through user charges. Unfortunately, this policy has not
been followed. Privatization still is an option in the transpor-
tation sector, for instance with respect to airports and other
areas of transportation such as major roads or railroad connec-
tions; privatization can also be used for industrial parks and
local environmental projects like water purification plants. In
these cases, the government would only have to set the frame of
reference under which private projects can be undertaken.
An important issue for the future is the division of tasks among
the federal government, the states and the municipalities with
respect to public expenditure and revenue. In the long run, a new
system of intergovernmental transfers (Finanzausgleich) will have
to be developed for Germany with new rules for allocating govern-
ment income and expenditure to the three layers of government. In
the actual system, the states only have a minor authority in de-
termining their revenue. More autonomy on the revenue side, and- 23 -
consequently, on the expenditure side, could be introduced, for
instance with a state-specific income tax rule. This would bring
about a process of institututional competition among states both
on the expenditure and the revenue side. In the very long run,
such an approach may go together with a redefinition of states so
that they are viable. ,
7. Conclusions
The risks studied in this paper relate to the problems arising
from transforming East Germany into a market economy. Of course,
this is not the complete set of risks for German economic policy.
Other economic risks may be a degradation in competitiveness due
to internal problems such as a high wage policy. A major issue is
what will happen in Eastern Europe. If reforms in the former So-
viet Union do not succeed, there is the risk of mass migration
and of the political instability of the former Soviet Union spil-
ling over to Western Europe. If reforms succeed, there is the
chance of a bright future.
Reviewing the risk factors of German economic policy analysed in
this paper, the policy approach must be to reduce these risks by
the appropriate policy measures. In the sense of a causal ther-
aPY/ preference must be given to stimulating the renewal of the
stock variables that were made obsolete in the transition to a
market economy. Thus, the goal must be to bring about private in-
vestment, to reduce the relevance of bottle-necks hindering the
self-sustained growth process, to continue the privatization pro-
cess and to abstain from structural policy. The second labor mar-
ket must be scaled down over time, and, of course, a delay of the
equalization in wages between East and West Germany would be most
helpful in bringing about increased economic activity in East
Germany. With respect to fiscal policy, a budget situation that
will become uncontrollable must be prevented.
Two opposite scenarios for the united Germany were drawn very
early in the discussion (Siebert 1990): the Mezzogiornio and the
New Frontier. In the worst case, existing inefficient firms are
subsidized in order to protect people. The inefficiency of the- 24 -
East German economy carries on and a chance to modernize it is
squandered. Then, a severe drain on Germany's resources would af-
fect the manoeuvring space of fiscal policy in the future. In the
alternative scenario the positive effects of German unification
prevail after the bottle-necks have been overcome. Unification
represents a New Frontier, an investment opportunity or in Schum-
peter's (1934) terms a case of "creative destruction". Integra-
tion gains, the new economic system and capital accumulation will
all play their role. I personally believe that this will be the
relevant scenario for the future. Barring serious political mis-
takes, the economic integration of the two Germanies will be a
growth stimulus for both Germanies, for Europe and for the world
ecbnomy.- 25 -
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Statistisches Bundesamt (1992), Deutsches Institut fUr Wirtschaftsforschung (1992); Sachverstandigenrat zur
Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1991).
(a) Including East Berlin; (b) Monthly resp. quarterly averages; not seasonally adjusted; (c) Prices of 2nd
half year 1990; (d) Including commuters; (f) Changes against previous quarter; (g) Net registrations.- 26 -








































































































































100.0 10 537 100.0
Privatized firms as a percent of all Treuhand firms.
2 -
As of September 4, 1991.
Source: Treuhandanstalt- 27 -




















(a) Including East Berlin,





























































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1992.
References: Statistisches Bundesamt 1991; Fachserie 18, Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 1.1, Konten und Standardtabellen S. 38.- 28 -




































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1991b), Deutsches Institut flir Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (1992)
Notes: (a) 1989 in East Marks, and in DM since the third quarter of 1990. Data for the economy
and the sectors are not fully comparable; (b) Wage sum per employee (excluding short-time
workers); (c) Standard wage rate; (d) Including special payments due to the discontinua-
tion of funds and reserves prior to the currency conversion; (e) Percentage change against
corresponding quarter of the previous year; (f) Data not seasonally adjusted.- 29 -






































































































































































































































































'calculated as additional income per year in proportion to addi-
tional capital stock-30 -
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